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Ireland faces a crisis of mass unemployment. More than 14 per cent of the labour 
force is unemployed, and long-term unemployment is growing rapidly. Active 
labour market policies (ALMPs) - consisting of a range of assistance, training and 
employment programmes to support the unemployed back to work - have been 
held out as an essential part of the policy response to unemployment. This paper 
examines  a wide range of national and international research  on the 
effectiveness of ALMPs to ask: i) what do ALMPs do for the unemployed?, ii) are 
some programmes more effective than others?  iii) what can we expect ALMPs to 
achieve in a recession?  The paper shows that while research on the impact of 
active labour market programmes is far from conclusive and faces a number of 
difficult methodological challenges, it does provide a basis on which to identify 
the types of programmes that have been found to enhance the employment 
prospects of their unemployed clients. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Ireland again faces a crisis of mass unemployment. Between the middle of 2007 
and the beginning of 2011, total employment in Ireland fell by over 345,000, or 
16 per cent. Unemployment increased from less than 5 to over 14 per cent. In 
mid 2011, the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) showed that over 
300,000 individuals were unemployed and actively looking for work. In August 
2011, there were almost 470,000 on the Live Register, including both 
unemployed and part-time under-employed recipients of Jobseekers Benefits or 
Allowance.  Active labour market policies  (ALMPs) consisting of a range of 
assistance, training and employment programmes to support the unemployed 
back to work have been held out as an essential part of the policy response to 
unemployment (see, for example, OECD, 2007).  This paper examines the national 
and international evidence on the effectiveness of ALMPs to ask: i) what do 
ALMPs do for the unemployed? ii) are some programmes more effective than 
others?, iii) what can we expect ALMPs to achieve in a recession? 
 
We begin by providing some background to ALMPs. This is followed by an outline 
of the key instruments used by Public Employment Services (PESs) to activate the 
unemployed, and also the main active labour market programmes utilized. 
Evidence on the effectiveness of various ALMPs is then presented. Finally, 
drawing on two meta-analysis studies, we highlight the ALMPs that have been 
found to be the most effective in reintegrating the unemployed back into 
employment. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND:  ACTIVE  LABOUR  MARKET  POLICIES AND ACTIVATION 
STRATEGIES 
In most European countries there has been some shift in emphasis and resource 
allocation  from  passive to active measures. Passive measures provide income 
support to unemployed people. In Ireland this mainly includes insurance-based 
Jobseekers Benefit and assistance-based Jobseekers Allowance. Active measures, 
such as the range of job placement, assistance and employment services, training 
programmes,  employment  subsidies and direct employment provision, are 
intended  to assist the unemployed back  to work. Increased emphasis on 
activation was initially advocated by the OECD in its 1994 Jobs Strategy, adopted 
by the European Commission in its European Employment Strategy in 1997, and 
reiterated by the OECD in its revised Jobs Strategy in 2007. In practice, there has 
been limited adoption of the activation agenda and just a few countries have 
substantially increased their spending on  active measures, relative to passive 
measures. This can be seen in Table 1, which gives the share of public spending 
on active and passive measures as a percentage of GDP. Since the principle was  
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first instigated in the mid-1990s, Sweden is the only country that has consistently 
spent a higher proportion of public expenditure on active measures. The United 
Kingdom has done likewise since 2001 and New Zealand since 2006. Ireland spent 
more on active than passive measures in only 2000 and 2001. Higher levels of 
unemployment have been put forward as a reason for the limited transfer of 
public resources into active measures  in many countries,  since  spending on 
passive income support will automatically increase during periods of high 
unemployment. However, even during periods of low unemployment in the last 
decade, public spending on passive measures was greater than on active 
measures in most countries.  
 
In Ireland unemployment averaged around 4.5 per cent between 2004 and 2008 
but spending on passive income support was higher than that on active 
measures. The share of spending on active measures as a proportion of total 
unemployment-related public spending actually declined during this period, from 
42.6 per cent to 40.5 per cent. Perhaps this goes some way to explaining the 
persistence of unemployment in Ireland over this period of rapid  economic 
growth, labour shortages and the successful absorption of large numbers of 
migrant workers into the Irish labour market. Given the buoyant macroeconomic 
conditions apparent during  the middle of the last decade, the level of 
unemployment could arguably have been reduced below the 4.5 per cent mark
1. 
The provision of income support is essential during an economic downturn; 
however, in most countries the emphasis appears not to shift in the direction of 
active measures during periods of low unemployment.  Obviously unemployment 
rates within any particular country will depend on both activation measures and a 
range of other macroeconomic factors.  
 
The issue of replacement rates
2, the standard indicator of the generosity of an 
unemployment benefit system, came to the fore at the time that the 1994 OECD 
Jobs Strategy  was being devised. The evidence at the time suggested that 
replacement rates were sufficiently large to act as a disincentive to work for 
many welfare recipients, thus leading to the creation of unemployment traps 
(Martin, 2000). In light of this, the adoption of the OECD Jobs Strategy led a 
number of countries to examine whether active labour market policies could be 
used more  effectively to both curb the unemployment trap and reduce high 
levels of unemployment. This examination in turn either led to the introduction 
of,  or  increased emphasis on,  ‘activation’ strategies in many countries (e.g. 
 
1   Within any economy a certain level of frictional unemployment will always exist as individuals move between jobs, 
so the lowest achievable level of unemployment is unclear.  
2   The replacement rate is the proportion of expected income from work which is replaced by unemployment and 
related welfare benefits (Martin, 2000). 4 
 
Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and 
USA), which had the objective of encouraging jobseekers to be more active in 
their efforts to find work and/or to improve their employability (OECD, 2007)
3. 
Activation strategies apply the principle of ‘mutual obligation’, which means that 
benefit recipients are expected to engage in job search and/or education, training 
or employment programmes in exchange for receiving benefit payments and 
efficient employment services. In applying this principle, PESs aim to monitor 
benefit recipients’ compliance with eligibility conditions and to implement, where 
necessary, temporary sanctions or benefit exclusions (OECD, 2007), thus linking 
activation measures with the replacement rate.  
 
Table 1: Public Expenditure on Passive and Active Labour Market Programmes as a Percentage of GDP 
  1990  1995  2000  2005  2007 
  Active  Passive  Active  Passive  Active  Passive  Active  Passive  Active  Passive 
EU-15:                     
Ireland  1.06  2.55  1.35  2.61  0.81  0.80  0.64  0.83  0.64  0.91 
Austria  0.32  1.00  0.38  1.60  0.52  1.17  0.63  1.51  0.68  1.25 
Belgium  1.09  2.56  1.21  2.73  1.22  2.11  1.19  2.33  1.30  2.00 
Denmark  1.06  4.38  1.72  4.30  1.89  2.38  1.58  2.34  1.31  1.50 
Finland  0.84  1.11  1.42  3.87  0.89  2.08  0.89  1.90  0.86  1.43 
France  0.72  1.37  1.19  1.51  1.19  1.38  0.89  1.58  0.92  1.24 
Germany  0.79  1.00  1.19  2.31  1.23  1.89  0.88  2.34  0.77  1.63 
Greece  0.19  0.40  0.40  0.38  -  0.39  -  0.40  -  - 
Italy   -  0.82  -  0.95  -  0.62  0.57  0.81  0.46  0.71 
Luxembourg  0.20  0.52  0.14  0.68  -  0.43  0.50  0.65  0.48  0.54 
Netherlands  1.27  2.43  1.36  2.80  1.47  1.75  1.30  2.01  1.09  1.39 
Portugal  0.48  0.33  0.50  0.86  0.63  0.82  0.69  1.32  0.53  1.09 
Spain  0.78  2.61  0.43  2.43  0.79  1.35  0.78  1.45  0.80  1.45 
Sweden  1.68  0.88  2.35  2.27  1.75  1.34  1.29  1.17  1.12  0.66 























Australia  0.22  1.12  0.74  1.26  0.37  0.88  0.38  0.56  0.32  0.42 
New Zealand  0.88  1.90  0.68  1.14  0.49  1.33  0.39  0.43  0.34  0.23 
Note:   - Data not available. 
Source:  OECD Online Database on Public Expenditure and Participant Stocks on LMP (see http://stats.oecd.org/ 
Index.aspx) 
 
The increased role of activation/mutual obligation strategies has been one of the 
main labour market policy reforms in the OECD in the last decade
4.  If such 
 
3   Activation strategies are increasingly being applied to non-employment benefit recipients, such as lone-parent and 
disability beneficiaries. See Carcillo and Grubb (2006) for more details. 
4   See Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl (2008) for a good overview of the evolution and development of activation strategies 
across various OECD countries.   
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strategies are designed appropriately then they can result in jobseekers having a 
better chance of finding employment, along with reducing the disincentive effect 
of high and long-lasting unemployment benefits. Research by the OECD (2003, 
2007) indicates that better labour market outcomes, particularly in terms of 
reducing benefit dependence, have been achieved in those countries that have 
implemented an effective activation/mutual obligations scheme.  
 
3.  INSTRUMENTS USED TO ACTIVATE THE UNEMPLOYED 
The primary objective of activation strategies is to encourage jobseekers to be 
more active in their efforts to find work and/or increase their employability. The 
key components of such a strategy are as follows (OECD, 2007)
5:
  
i.  Registration for placement and assessment of work availability as 
preconditions for benefit payment; 
ii.  Regular and intense interventions in the unemployment spell by the PES; 
iii.  Explicit regulations regarding job search requirements; 
iv.  Direct referrals to vacant jobs; 
v.  Referrals to ALMPs (including education, training and employment 
programmes), with compulsory participation for some jobseekers. 
 
In most countries, registration with the placement service and assessment of 
work availability are preconditions for benefit payment. The combination of 
activation and income support is intended to emphasize the importance of the 
focus on ‘work’ as opposed to ‘benefit’ when contact with the PES commences. 
There are a few countries, Ireland included, where registration for benefit 
precedes that for placement. The rationale for such a system is not clear, with the 
time lag to registration leading to a number of potential matches of jobseekers to 
suitable jobs being missed when benefit is already being paid (OECD, 2007), thus 
implying an inefficient use of public resources. However, the Irish system is 
currently undergoing a major structural reform, including the integration of the 
benefit and placement functions within the newly established National 
Employment and Entitlements Service (Department of Social Protection, 2011).  
 
Interventions in the unemployment spell refer to compulsory scheduled contacts 
between the jobseeker and the  PES. These include: (i) the initial registration 
 
5   Voluntary interviews and collective information sessions are also used by some countries to activate the unemployed. 6 
 
interview for placement and benefit, (ii) detailed registration interview
6,  (iii) 
regular intensive interviews to report and monitor job search activities and work 
availability, referrals to vacant jobs, feedback on job application outcomes, 
discussion of individual action plans and referrals to ALMPs. An individual action 
plan is an agreement signed by both the jobseeker and the PES officer. Typically 
such a plan: (i) describes the jobseeker’s situation, (ii) outlines the actions to be 
undertaken by the jobseeker, in terms of job search activities and/or active 
labour market programme participation, and (iii) the duties of the employment 
service in facilitating the jobseeker to find a job and/or to increase their 
employability. 
 
A  number of countries now have explicit regulations  relating to job search 
requirements and stipulate that jobseekers regularly report and document their 
job search actions. The frequency of reporting and number of job search activities 
to be undertaken varies by country and also jobseeker type.  
 
A direct referral to a vacant job is when the PES offers a specific vacancy to a 
jobseeker. This activation measure can occur at the initial interview
7 and/or at 
subsequent intensive interviews. The main benefit of a direct job referral is that it 
can speed up the matching process and, thus, reduce benefit payment along with 
the risk of prolonged unemployment. A critical feature of this measure is the 
provision of feedback on the application outcome, from both the jobseeker and 
employer.  
 
Referrals to ALMPs are also an important feature of an activation strategy. The 
types of ALMPs that are employed by PESs, which are discussed in more detail in 
Section  IV, vary substantially across countries, and countries are continuously 
modifying their programmes, or introducing new ones; with the result that there 
is rarely a stable set of ALMPs to evaluate (Martin, 2000).   
 
The revised OECD Jobs Strategy recommended that effective ALMPs should be 
compulsory after a certain period of unemployment  (OECD, 2007). Research 
 
6   Full registration interviews are conducted in those countries that only collect basic information at the initial placement 
interview. This interview is needed to obtain more detailed information on the benefit claimant (e.g. education 
qualifications, work history, etc.) so that the person can be referred to an appropriate vacant job or to an active labour 
market programme. Such interviews are also used to explain the full range of  services provided by the PES, the rights 
and duties of the benefit claimant, application of a profiling instrument (if in existence) and to establish an individual 
action plan. In some countries, these latter tasks are carried out at the initial registration interview. 
7   If work availability is evaluated at the initial placement interview as a pre-condition for benefit entitlement then the 
PES can intervene immediately with job offers.   
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indicates that participation in such programmes can speed up the re-employment 
process.  It has also been found that referral to ALMPs with the threat of benefit 
sanctions for non-participation can lead to increases in the number of individuals 
going from benefit to work around the formal deadline for programme entry. This 
‘motivation’ or ‘threat’ effect, whereby individuals cease claiming benefits and re-
enter the labour market in order to avoid the obligation of programme 
participation, can have a positive impact on re-employment rates (see Black et al. 
2003; Rosholm and Svarer, 2004; Geerdsen, 2006; Geerdsen and Holm, 2007; and 
Graversen and van Ours, 2006).  Most countries do not require jobseekers to 
continue with their job search obligations when participating in an ALMP. 
However, the OECD (2007) recommends that some time should be set aside for 
individuals participating in publicly subsidised employment schemes to continue 
their job search, as take up of market-sector jobs is viewed as being of greater 
benefit to the jobseeker
8.  
 
In implementing activation strategies, the PES can impose temporary sanctions or 
benefit exclusions on jobseekers that do not comply with job-search 
requirements and activation measures. Several studies have found that the 
imposition of a sanction has a positive effect on re-employment rates (OECD, 
2007).  Boone and Van Ours (2006) and Boone et al. (2007) have developed 
theoretical models that illustrate that from a welfare point of view it is more 
optimal to introduce monitoring and sanctions into a welfare payment system. 
 
In most countries, activation policies are implemented by the country’s PES. 
However, some countries
9 contract private providers to implement their policies, 
either in full or in conjunction with the PES. The evaluation results on the 
effectiveness of such out-sourcing mechanisms are mixed,  largely due to the 
implementation of such mechanisms as opposed to the quality of the services 
offered by private providers in general
10. 
 
Poorly controlled access to non-employment income-maintenance schemes, such 
as disability, lone-parent and early retirement, can undermine the impact of 
activation measures for unemployment benefit recipients, as some of the long-
term unemployed enter benefit schemes that facilitate economic inactivity. This 
 
8   The OECD suggests that jobseekers  undertaking training courses that are expected to deliver a certificate on 
completion should be exempt from job-search actions.   
9   For example, Australia, Germany, Netherlands and United Kingdom. 
10   See Tergeist and Grubb (2006) for further information on the use of quasi-market mechanisms in the provision of 
employment services. 8 
 
suggests the need for non-employment benefit gate-keeping (Tergeist and Grubb, 
2006). 
 
4.  ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMMES 
The main ALMPs to assist jobseekers to reintegrate into the labour market are as 
follows
11: 
i.  Job search assistance, monitoring  and sanctions; 
ii.  Training programmes; 
iii.  Public-sector job creation programmes;  




Job Search Assistance (JSA) and sanctions include a variety of measures that aim 
to increase the effectiveness of job search. Examples of such measures include: 
counselling, monitoring, job search courses, vocational guidance, establishment 
of individual action plans, direct referrals to vacant jobs and the imposition of 
sanctions when jobseekers do not comply with the job search activities that are 
required for receipt of unemployment benefits. JSA tends to be the least costly 
ALMP (Martin, 2000; Kluve, 2006). Furthermore, compared to other ALMPs, JSA 
rates well in evaluation studies. However, the evidence suggests that JSA needs 
to be combined with increased monitoring of jobseekers.  
 
The  key  objective  of  training programmes is to enhance jobseekers’  human 
capital and, thus, their employment prospects. Training programmes vary 
according  to jobseeker type. For example, some jobseekers require basic job 
search training or other general skills (e.g. basic computer skills), while others 
undertake more intensive and specific training to either enhance their 
employability or to secure better quality jobs (e.g. advanced computer 
programmes). Training tends to account for the largest share of spending on 
active measures (Martin, 2000). However, evaluations of the performance of 
public training programmes, which are discussed in more detail below,  are 
mixed
13. According to Martin (2000), the design of public training programmes is 
 
11   Programmes are often targeted at specific groups, e.g. young workers (25 years of age and younger), disabled, 
lone-parents, immigrants, etc. See Aakvik et al.,(2005) and Kirby and Riley (2004) for disability and lone-parent 
programme evaluations, while some of the literature that has evaluated youth programmes is discussed below.   
12   A strict classification of an ALMP into one of these four categories is not always feasible as some countries have 
schemes that contain elements of two or more of these programmes. 
13   The ‘lock-in effect’ is one of the reasons for the poor performance of some training programmes, which is when job 
entry rates decline due to a decline in job search efforts when participating in a training programme.  
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critical to their effectiveness. Specifically, such programmes need to be tightly 
targeted at participants, relatively small in scale and establish strong links with 
local  employers through the inclusion of an on-the-job component in the 
programme.  
 
Job search assistance and training mainly seek to influence the supply side of the 
labour market, while direct job creation in the public sector and incentives to 
create jobs in the private sector seek to influence the demand side. Public-sector 
job creation programmes focus on the creation of public jobs that produce public 
goods and services. The main objective of this type of programme is to keep the 
unemployed jobseeker in contact with the labour market and, thus, to prevent 
the erosion of their human capital while unemployed. However, such jobs are 
often not close to the regular labour market (Kluve, 2006). 
 
The aim of private sector incentive programmes is to create incentives that  alter 
employer and/or worker behaviour regarding private sector employment. For 
example, wage subsidies in the private sector  are intended  to encourage 
employers to either create new jobs or to maintain existing positions. Such 
subsidies, which can be given directly to the employer or employee, tend to be 
for a fixed period of time and are often targeted at more disadvantaged 
individuals. Start-up incentives, which are provided to unemployed individuals 
that want to establish their own business, are another type of private sector 
incentive programme.  
 
5.  EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ACTIVE  LABOUR  MARKET 
PROGRAMMES 
There is a substantial body of research seeking to evaluate the effectiveness of 
ALMPs. This work, which goes back to the mid-1970s
14, aims to assess the impact 
of programme participation on an  individual’s employment, unemployment 
and/or earnings after he/she has left the programme relative to a benchmark 
group of similar individuals that did not participate (Martin, 2000)
15. The research 
presented in this paper is, for the most part, evaluations of ALMPs that were 
implemented in various European countries in the 1990s and 2000s, and which 
 
14   Researchers in the US began conducting evaluation studies around this time, whereas European researchers started 
much later.  
15   Some macro-econometric studies have also been conducted on the effectiveness of active labour market programmes. 
See OECD (2006b), Kluve, Card, Fertig et al. (2005) and Martin (2000) for some discussion on the results that have been 
found in this literature. 10 
 
focus on employment and/or unemployment outcomes
16. An overview of the 
studies is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
Job Search Assistance, Monitoring and Sanctions 
A number of studies have found that JSA measures (e.g. interviews, counselling, 
etc.), including monitoring of job search behaviour and the threat and/or 
imposition of sanctions for non-compliance, can be effective in increasing the 
transition from unemployment to work. Some studies have shown that JSA 
measures on their own can have positive employment effects. For example, 
Crépon, Dejemeppe and Gurgand (2011) evaluated four French JSA schemes and 
found that each programme increased the transition to employment and also 
reduced unemployment recurrence, with the job search support programme 
having the strongest effect overall. Other researchers, such as Cockx and 
Dejemeppe (2007) using Belgian data, have shown that the threat of monitoring 
job search activities in isolation from JSA measures (e.g. counselling) can improve 
unemployed workers probability of employment, and increasingly so as benefit 
claimants approach the time at which monitoring takes place. The positive threat 
effect discovered by Cockx and Dejemeppe (2007) specifically related to highly 
educated workers, suggesting the threat of increased monitoring may be less 
effective for more disadvantaged workers. There is also some concern that the 
threat of increased monitoring may result in workers accepting lower quality 
jobs, although, Cockx and Dejemeppe (2007) argue that this outcome can be 
countered by appropriate scheduling of JSA interviews and the provision of 
effective counselling. 
 
Positive results have also been found for the imposition of sanctions for non-
compliance with job search requirements. A study by van den Berg et al. (2004) in 
the Netherlands found that  sanctions substantially increased the individual 
transition rate from welfare to work (see also Abbring, van den Berg and van 
Ours, 2005). Lalive et al. (2005) found that both sanction warning and 
enforcement had a positive effect on the exit rate from unemployment in 
Switzerland
17.  A number of other evaluations have found that JSA measures 
coupled with increased monitoring of job search behaviour and sanctions have 
been successful in getting unemployed individuals back to work
18. Examples of 
 
16   See Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999) and Kluve and Schmidt (2002) for earlier systematic reviews on the 
effectiveness of active labour market programmes in both Europe and the US. See also Martin (2000), Martin and 
Grubb (2001), OECD (2005) and OECD (2006b) for a review of the effectiveness of various OECD country programmes. 
17   Lalive et al. (2005) concluded that their results were evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.  
18   Examples of US studies that have derived this result include Katz and Meyer (1990), Meyer (1990) and Meyer (1995). 




this include Müller and Steiner (2008) for Germany, Svarer (2007) for Denmark, 
Dolton and O’Neill (1996) for the UK
19 and Sianesi (2008) for Sweden
20.  
 
While there is some debate in the literature over the optimal combination of 
assistance, monitoring and the threat and/or enforcement of sanctions, it would 
appear that, by and large, a combination of all components are needed to 
produce benefits for both unemployed workers and society at large (Martin, 
2000; OECD, 2005 and 2006b; and Kluve, 2006). 
 
Job Search Assistance in Ireland 
Evaluations of job search assistance and monitoring in Ireland have been quite 
limited, and have mainly centred on the National Employment Action Plan 
(NEAP). The NEAP requires those who have been unemployed for a period of 
three months to be referred by the Department of Social Protection (DSP) to FÁS, 
Ireland’s national employment and training authority, for interview, which in turn 
can initiate further assistance with job search, guidance, counselling, referral to 
employment or, in some cases, training or other ALMPs. Early evaluations of the 
NEAP were positive but hampered by the absence of adequate data to support 
rigorous econometric analysis (O’Connell, 2002a; Indecon, 2005).  Grubb et al. 
(2009) argued that the separation of income support and employment placement 
services undermined the potential for activation, as did the virtual absence of 
sanctions and the under-resourcing of activation services. A recent evaluation of 
the NEAP as it operated between 2006 and 2008 (McGuinness, O’Connell, Kelly 
and Walsh, 2011),  found that there were problems of access to NEAP 
programmes with the result that not all those who should have participated in an 
activation measure did so. A substantial group of jobseekers, about 25 per cent, 
who were eligible for assistance under the NEAP were not identified and referred. 
Another group, over 25 per cent, were not eligible for NEAP referral because they 
had received some form of assistance in a previous unemployment spell.  This 
practice of excluding those who went through the NEAP process during a 
previous period of unemployment would appear to run counter to the underlying 
rationale of activation policies: to assist those most likely to encounter difficulties 
in finding work. The evaluation also showed that those who participated in the 
NEAP activation interview were less likely to become employed: comparing the 
outcomes of those who were referred for a FÁS interview under the NEAP, 
 
unemployed workers, which included sanctions for non-compliance, on post-programme unemployment durations and 
found that the program had a positive but small effect, with the impact being larger for females.  
19   The Dolton and O’Neill (1996) results come from an assessment of the ‘Restart’ programme.  
20   Sianesi (2008) evaluated six Swedish ALMPs and found that each had a negative short-term impact on their 
participants’ employment probability relative to unemployed individuals that had JSA type assistance. Apart from wage 
subsidies, the same results on the other ALMPs held in the long-run as well. 12 
 
including both those who attended and those who did not attend the interview, 
with a control group of those who were not referred, it was found that the NEAP 
was associated with a negative impact, with the chances of entering employment 
being about 17 per cent lower for those who went through the interview process. 




The findings from the empirical literature on the effectiveness of training 
programmes are mixed. Some studies have found positive effects of participation 
in training programmes on employment/unemployment. For example, Cockx 
(2003) found that classroom training programmes in Belgium increased the 
transition rate from unemployment. Richardson and van den Berg (2006) also 
found that vocational training in Sweden had a positive impact on exits to work, 
although this effect only held for the first few weeks after course completion. 
Rosholm and Skipper (2009), on the other hand, found that Danish classroom 
training programmes increased participants’ unemployment rates in the period 
immediately after the training ended - a result the authors attributed to a ‘lock-in 
effect’, since the negative effect disappeared over time. However, they also 
found that in the long run training actually increased the time that programme 
participants spent in employment
21. The lock-in effect, which is when job search 
declines during (or immediately after) participation in a training course, may be 
one of the main reasons for the poor performance of some training programmes 
that have been evaluated over a short time horizon. In analysing public-
sponsored training programmes in France, Crépon et al. (2011) also estimated a 
negative effect on the exit rate from unemployment but a positive impact on the 
duration of subsequent employment  spells. For Germany, Fitzenberger, 
Osikominu and Paul (2010) found that training had positive employment effects 
in the medium and long-term, as did Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2011), 
Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2007), Lechner and Wunsch (2009), and 
Fitzenberger, Osikominu and Völter (2006)
22.  However, earlier evaluations of 
German training programmes (e.g. Lechner, 2000; and Hujer and Wellner, 2000) 
found no significant effects.   
 
 
21  Other Danish studies have found insignificant or negative employment effects for their labour market training 
programmes: see Rosholm and Skipper (2009) for more details. 
22   Lechner  et al.  (2011), Lechner, et al.  (2007), Lechner and Wunsch, (2009) and Fitzenberger et al.  (2006) all 
identified negative employment effects in the short-run, which each study attributed to a lock-in effect. Lechner 
and Wunsch (2009) also found that the negative lock-in effects that they identified were smaller in times of higher 
unemployment and the positive long-run effects were larger.  
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Results from evaluations of the impact of the duration of training have also been 
mixed. In France, Crépon et al. (2011) found that longer training spells led to 
longer unemployment spells but also to longer employment spells. Fitzenberger 
et al. (2010) found a similar result for Germany. Kluve, Schneider, Uhlendorff and 
Zhao (2007), again for Germany, found positive employment effects for training 
programs with durations of up to three months, but programs longer than this 
did not add any additional benefits (see also Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu 
and Waller, 2007). Hujer, Thomsen and Zeiss (2006), on the other hand, found no 
impact for short-term vocational training programmes, while medium (six month) 
and long (twelve month) programs had negative employment effects. Thus, the 
research on the impact of the duration of training programme duration remains 
inconclusive.  
 
A series of papers on Germany’s experience with training provide useful evidence 
regarding the differential impact of different types of training programmes. 
Biewen  et al.  (2007),  in their analysis of the impact of short-term training 
programs, found that ‘practical’ courses performed better than ‘classroom’ 
training. Lechner et al. (2011), looking at the impact of three programs in former 
West Germany,  found that ‘retraining’, for  up to 2 years for a different 
professional qualification, had the biggest employment impact seven years after 
program start, followed by short-duration (about five months) and long-duration 
(9 to 12 months) training to provide additional qualifications in  a current 
profession. Yet, when lock-in effects were taken into consideration, ‘short 
training’ to upgrade skills in the current occupation outperformed the other two 
programs. They found no sustainable positive effects for training in ‘practice 
firms’ that simulate working in a specific occupation. In another evaluation, 
Lechner  et al.  (2007) investigated the impact of the same three programs in 
former East Germany and found that, on average, all three programs displayed 
negative employment effects in the short-run and positive effects in the long-run. 
However, the positive long-run effects identified for the three programs applied 
to females only, as the ‘long training’ program had a negative employment effect 
for males and the ‘retraining’ program an insignificant effect
23. In East Germany, 
Fitzenberger and Völter (2007) found that training in specific professional skills 
and techniques (SBST) to enhance qualifications in a current occupation produced 
positive medium (1-3 years) and long-run (4-6 years) employment effects, 
although there were strong negative lock-in effects for the first two years. 
However, neither practice firms nor retraining for a different occupation showed 
consistent positive employment effects, in contrast to the positive effects found 
 
23   Lechner et al. (2007) attributed the male results to inappropriate long-term courses by the Public Employment 
Service (PES), which largely consisted of training in construction which was experiencing a boom at the time of 
training but by the time the participants had completed their courses the sector was in recession. 14 
 
for these two programmes by Lechner et al. (2011). Fitzenberger, Osikominu and 
Völter (2006) conducted a similar analysis for West Germany and derived slightly 
different results. Specifically, after initial lock-in effects in the short-run, all three 
programs exhibited positive employment effects in the medium and long-term. 
As  in  East Germany, SPST performed better than the other two programs. 
Arellano (2010) examined a variety of training courses in Spain and found that 
‘medium-level’ programmes, including occupational training for unskilled 
workers, and specialist training for skilled workers, reduced the length of 
unemployment spells, with stronger effects for females.  
 
The results from studies comparing  the effectiveness of training programmes 
against other types of ALMPs are also mixed. For example, Kluve, Lehmann and 
Schmidt (1999) found a statistically significant positive effect of training 
programmes on participants’ employment rates in Poland, while both public 
employment and wage subsidies had a negative effect. Van Ours (2001) also 
found that training had a positive effect on the job placement rate of 
unemployed workers in the Slovak Republic. So did public-sector subsidised jobs, 
but private-sector wage subsidies had a negative effect. Van Ours attributed the 
positive training result to reverse causality: unemployed workers only entered 
the training programme because they were promised a job. Fitzenberger, 
Orlyanskaya, Osikominu and Waller (2008) found that both skills training and a 
short-term  programme focussing on job-search assistance and monitoring  in 
Germany had positive employment effects, but the effect of training was 
stronger.    Neubäumer (2010) found that both vocational training and wage 
subsidies in Germany had a positive employment impact in both the short-term 
(after an initial lock-in period) and the medium term, although wage subsidies 
had a stronger impact than vocational training. Jespersen, Munch and Skipper 
(2008) found no significant effect from classroom training on participants’ 
employment in Denmark, while wage subsidies had a positive impact
24. Using 
Swedish data, Sianesi (2008) found that unemployed individuals that participated 
in a training programme subsequently displayed lower employment rates, along 
with higher benefit dependency. Wage subsidies, on the other hand, increased 
employment prospects in the long-term. Overall, Sianesi (2008) concluded that 
ALMPs that resemble regular employment perform better. An earlier study of 
Swedish ALMPs by Carling and Richardson (2004) derived similar results: 
subsidised work experience and training provided by firms had better outcomes 
than classroom vocational training. Negative or insignificant training effects have 
also been identified for Switzerland (Lalive, van Ours and Zweimüller, 2008; and 
 
24   Furthermore, in a cost-benefit analysis of the large-scale system of ALMPs in Denmark, Jespersen et al. (2008) 
found that classroom training led to a deficit.  
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Gerfin and Lechner, 2002) and various other European countries (see Kluve, 
2006).   
 
Training in Ireland 
Compared to many other OECD countries, there is a shortage of rigorous 
evidence on the impact of training in Ireland. O’Connell (2002b) and O’Connell 
and McGinnity (1997) argued that in relation to both supply- and demand- side 
measures, programmes with strong linkages to the labour market are more likely 
to enhance the employment prospects of their participants. In relation to training 
programmes delivered during the 1990s, they found that training in specific skills 
was more likely to increase participants’ subsequent probability of employment. 
This is consistent with the findings from Sweden by Sianesi (2008) and Carling and 
Richardson (2004) discussed above. Conniffe, Gash and O’Connell (2000) focussed 
on young unemployed individuals and found that general training had no 
significant effect on this group’s probability of gaining employment.  McGuinness, 
O’Connell and Kelly (2011) found that, on average, training did increase the 
probability of exiting unemployment in the 2006-2008 period. Their analysis also 
shows that the type of training matters:  job-search training and high-level 
specific skills training are most likely to increase the probability of their 
participants exiting from unemployment. There was no consistent evidence to 
suggest that low-level skills training significantly increase employment prospects.  
In general shorter duration training programmes were found to be more 
effective, with the exception of high-level skills training where there appears to 
be a pay-off to more extended training durations.  They also call attention to the 
fact that a  minority of participants took part in the more effective training 
programs and that over two-thirds of all training days delivered during the 
eighteen month period considered were in less effective training programmes.   
 
Public Sector Job Creation Programmes 
Direct employment schemes in the public sector are usually targeted at 
disadvantaged individuals and provide subsidised work usually in the social 
economy, with the aim of maintaining contact with the labour market and 
familiarity with work habits as well as reducing loss of skills during a spell of 
unemployment. Where such programmes are well organised, they can generate 
socially useful goods and services. However, the evidence from the evaluation 
literature indicates that direct job creation in the public sector has not, for the 
most part, been successful in assisting unemployed individuals to secure 
permanent jobs in the ordinary labour market. In evaluating active labour market 
programmes in Poland, Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt (1999) found that public 
work had negative employment effects for its participants, a result the authors 
mainly attributed to ‘benefit churning’ as opposed to stigmatisation from 16 
 
programme participation
25. Sianesi (2008) also found that public relief work in 
Sweden lowered participants’ future employment rates
26.  Gerfin and Lechner 
(2002) and Lalive et al. (2008) derived a similar result for Switzerland, as did 
Jespersen et al. (2008) for Denmark. In examining the Slovak Republic’s ALMPs, 
van Ours (2001) found that unemployed individuals that had participated in a 
public sector job programme were more likely to find a job and less likely to lose 
the job than those that had not. However, he attributed these two results to 
signalling rather than to the impact of the job programme per se
27. Overall, the 
evidence suggests that direct job creation in the public sector has not been 
successful in improving the labour market prospects of unemployed workers (see 
also Martin 2000; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002; OECD, 2005; and OECD, 2006).   
 
Direct Employment Schemes in Ireland 
The evidence for Ireland on direct employment schemes is consistent with the 
pessimistic international findings. Most of the research has focussed on 
Community Employment (CE), the largest such direct employment scheme and, 
indeed, the single largest active labour market programme implemented in 
Ireland over the last decade and a half. Evaluations comparing CE participants 
with control groups of non-participants found that participation in CE was not 
associated with increased post-programme employment chances (O’Connell and 
McGinnity, 1997; O’Connell, 2002b). While CE has not been the subject of a 
rigorous evaluation in recent years, an analysis of the factors associated with 
long-term unemployment in the 2006-2008 period found that previous 
participation in a CE scheme was associated with an increased risk of long-term 
unemployment, even when a range of personal characteristics and labour market 
experience was taken into account (O’Connell, McGuinness, Kelly and Walsh, 
2009). 
 
Private Sector Incentive Schemes 
Private-sector incentive schemes consist of both wage subsidies to private sector 
employers and start-up grants for self employment. While a few studies have 
obtained negative or insignificant employment effects for private subsidised 
employment programmes, such as Kluve et al. (1999) for Poland
28 and van Ours 
 
25   In Poland, participation in an ALMP entitles benefit recipients to a further 12 months of benefit payment.  
26   Carling and Richardson (2004) came to a similar conclusion in an earlier study using Swedish data. 
27   According to van Ours (2001), by accepting a position on a public sector job programme unemployed workers are 
signalling to potential employers that they have a positive attitude towards work.  
28   Kluve  et al. (1999) found that Poland’s subsidised employment programme had a large negative impact on the 
employment rate of males and no impact on females. The authors attributed the male result to interactions between 
the programme and the unemployment compensation system in Poland.   
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(2001) for the Slovak Republic, positive results from such schemes have been 
found in most countries. For example, Jespersen et al. (2008) found that wage 
subsidies in Denmark had substantial positive employment and earnings effects.  
Even when the costs of providing this ALMP were accounted for, the programme 
still came out with a surplus (see also Rosholm and Svarer, 2004). Both Lalive et 
al. (2008) and Gerfin and Lechner (2002) derived positive employment results for 
temporary wage subsidies in Switzerland. In analysing Sweden’s ALMPs, Sianesi 
(2008) found that, after an initial lock-in effect, job subsidies increased 
participants’ employment prospects in the long-term and reduced 
unemployment benefit dependency (see also Carling and Richardson, 2004). As 
with Sianesi (2008), Jaenichen and Stephan (2009) found that after an initial lock-
in effect wage subsidies in Germany had a positive impact on the employment 
prospects of hard-to-place workers, with the impact being stronger for female 
workers  and  smaller for those that had participated in a short-term training 
measure prior to receipt of the wage subsidy. In another German study, 
Boockmann et al. (2007) found that the availability of hiring subsidies for older 
workers  only had a positive employment effect in respect of females in East 
Germany, leading them to   conclude that, in most cases, wage subsidies in 
Germany do not change firms’ hiring behaviour and suffer from high deadweight. 
In general, the findings in relation to wage subsidies are encouraging. However, 
one needs to bear in mind that most studies do not account for the potential 
deadweight and displacement effects associated with such schemes
29.  
 
Private Sector Incentives in Ireland 
Research on the effectiveness of incentives to support employment in the private 
sector in Ireland is also limited and quite dated. Breen and Halpin (1989) found 
that subsidies to support self-employment targeted at the long-term unemployed 
in the 1980s had positive effects on their  subsequent employment chances.   
O’Connell (2002b) and O’Connell and McGinnity (1997) showed  that wage 
subsidies to support employment experience in private sector firms were more 
likely to enhance post-programme employment prospects, compared with a 
comparison group of non-participants and controlling for other relevant personal 
characteristics and labour market experience. A number of internship 
programmes have recently been initiated in Ireland (e.g. JobBridge), but it is too 
early to evaluate their impact.  
 
 
29   The net effect of any policy intervention targeting employment levels will be total employment growth less deadweight 
and displacement.  Deadweight refers to any change in the key outcome variable, for example, employment growth in 
the context of a wage subsidy that would have occurred even if the wage subsidy was absent.  Displacement refers to 




Many young people have short spells of unemployment during their transition 
from school-to-work.  However, some get trapped in unemployment and risk 
becoming long-term unemployed (OECD, 2009a)
30. The severity of the current 
global recession has increased the danger of this outcome among young adults, 
particularly disadvantaged youth that left school early without basic education 
(Scarpetta, Sonnet and Manfredi, 2010). In general, young people are somewhat 
more vulnerable to unemployment during an economic downturn due to their 
concentration in temporary jobs and cyclically-sensitive industries (OECD, 
2009b)
31.  Thus, a key priority of governments at present should be the 
introduction of measures to minimise the impact of the recession on young 
people and, in particular, policies to prevent them from falling into long-term 
unemployment. The objective of youth measures is often not only to enhance 
young unemployed individuals’ employment prospects but also to encourage re-
entry to education. The greater exposure to unemployment and to the risk of 
long-term unemployment may be why there has been a particular research focus 
on the impact of ALMPs among young people, although results are mixed, as is 
the case in respect of adult programmes.  
 
Hardoy (2005) found that a youth employment programme in Norway, which 
consisted of both wage subsidies and a public sector job creation scheme, had a 
positive impact on young female participants’ subsequent employment 
probabilities, but no such effect among males. However, Hardoy did not find a 
positive effect for any of the other youth active labour market programmes that 
she examined, which included training and vocational programmes. In fact, the 
vocational programmes were found to reduce the full-time employment of the 
targeted age group (16-19 years).  
 
Brodaty, Crépon and Fougère (2002) analysed the  employment  impact of a 
variety of French ALMPs for young unemployed individuals for two different time 
points, 1986-1988 and 1995-1998.  In the earlier time period they found positive 
effects for workplace training among short-term unemployed young people, and 
for training and integration programmes to promote self confidence and 
motivation among the long-term unemployed. However, these positive effects 
 
30   http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/62/43765276.pdf 
31   http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/50/43766254.pdf  
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were not maintained into the later period, notwithstanding the similarity of 
macro-economic conditions in the two periods considered
32.  
 
Hämäläinen and Ollikainen (2004) examined the effectiveness of Finnish youth 
active labour market programmes and found that training programmes and 
employment  schemes in both the public and private sectors improved the 
employment prospects of programme participants. However, they  also found 
that Finland’s largest youth programme,  “Youth Practical Training”,  had no   
significant effect on participants’ future labour market prospects.  
 
Jensen, Rosholm and Svarer (2003) analysed the impact of the Danish “Youth 
Unemployment Programme” designed to increase the employment prospects of 
low-educated unemployed youth and to encourage their return to education.  
They found a strong positive impact on the transition rate from unemployment to 
school but its impact on the transition to employment was weak.  
 
Larsson (2002) evaluated the effectiveness of training and subsidized 
employment programmes for young people in Sweden. In the short-run, both 
programmes were found to have a negative impact on participants’ employment 
prospects and earnings, while neither programme had any effect in the long run. 
Larsson also found that training had a negative impact on participants’ return to 
regular education, while subsidised employment had no impact, leading to the 
conclusion that the wage subsidy was “less harmful” than training.  
 
Dorsett (2006) examined the relative effectiveness of the options offered under 
Britain’s New Deal for Young People (NDYP) on young males’ likelihood of exiting 
unemployment: the NDYP is Britain’s mandatory youth active labour market 
programme. Of the various measures examined, which included JSA
33,  wage 
subsidies, education/training programme, work placement in a voluntary sector 
and work placement in a government organisation, wage subsidies was found to 
be the most effective tool for assisting young males to exit unemployment. This 
was followed by the JSA component of the NDYP. Similar results for the New Deal 
measures have been found by Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir and van Reenen 
(2004) and van Reenen (2003). Lissenburgh (2004) also found that the New Deal 
 
32   In a survey of studies that evaluated the effects of active labour market programmes on youth employment in 
France, Fougère et al. (2000) found that only training programs with a large training content (e.g. apprenticeships) 
had a positive impact on young peoples’ post-training employment probabilities. 
33   Measured by an extended stay on Gateway: Gateway, which is the first stage of the New Deal programme, is a period 
of intensive job search assistance with a case worker.  20 
 
wage subsidy and JSA options were the most effective measures for assisting 
unemployed youths in Scotland. 
 
In summary, the results are, by and large, supportive of wage subsidies, although, 
the potential deadweight  and  displacement effects associated with wage 
subsidies are not accounted for in the evaluations of youth programme 
evaluations, as is also the case in the evaluation of adult programmes. Mandatory 
participation and/or the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance seem to be 
common in countries where youth measures have proven to be successful (e.g. 
Denmark and the United Kingdom).   
 
6.  WHAT WORKS?  
It is difficult to identify  what one country can learn from other countries’ 
experiences with ALMPs, particularly in terms of identifying what programmes 
have been found to work. This is due to variations in economic and institutional 
settings across countries, along with specific programme characteristics (e.g. 
type, scale
34,  target group, etc.), methodological issues in conducting the 
evaluations
35 (e.g., data used, methodology employed, outcome measured, use 
of selection controls, etc.) and the time period over which programmes are 
assessed
36. In their recent surveys of the evaluation literature, both Kluve (2006) 
and Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) use a meta-analytical framework
37  to 
overcome these cross-country comparison problems and draw conclusions on 
what countries can learn from each other on ALMP effectiveness.  
 
The two meta-analysis studies, each of which is based on more than 100 
evaluations, took account of: (i) programme type, (ii) methodology, (iii) 
institutional context, (iv) the economic background in the country at the time the 
particular programme was in operation, (v) the country the programme relates to 
and (vi) the decade in which the programme was run, to identify the effectiveness 
 
34   Many programmes that have been evaluated tend to be small scale or trial programmes; thus, while such 
programmes might produce positive outcomes, the positive results might not hold if the programme was extended 
in terms of participant numbers or geographic coverage (Martin, 2000). 
35   See Heckman et al. (1999), Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) and Kluve and Schmidt (2002) for a discussion of the 
methodological issues that arise in evaluating active labour market programmes (see also Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd, 1998). Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) provide a survey of the most recent methodological advances in 
evaluating active labour market programmes (see also Cahuc and Le Barbanchon, 2010). 
36   The majority of evaluations focus on short-term outcomes (e.g. one to two years after the person has participated 
in a programme); consequently, a programme that is found to be effective in the short-run might not necessarily 
have long-term benefits, and vice-versa. 
37   A meta-analysis is a statistical procedure that combines the results from different studies that address the same 
scientific question (e.g. ALMP effectiveness) in order to obtain a quantitative estimate of the overall effect of a 




38. In particular, the two studies assessed the effectiveness of: (i) 
JSA and sanctions, (ii) training programmes, (iii) public sector job creation 
programmes and (iv) private sector incentive schemes, in terms of whether each 
programme had a positive, negative or insignificant treatment effect on post-
programme employment rates.  
 
In terms of the results, overall both Kluve (2006) and Card et al. (2010) found that 
once the type of ALMP is taken account of, e.g. JSA, training, etc., there is little 
systematic relationship between programme effectiveness and the other 
contextual factors. Kluve (2006) showed that relative to training programmes, JSA 
combined with sanctions,  and private sector incentive schemes,  had higher 
probabilities of positive treatment effects, while the opposite was the case for 
direct employment schemes in the public sector. Card et al. (2010) found similar 
results. However, Card et al. (2010) assessed both the short-term and long-term 
effectiveness of ALMPs and found that JSA had more favourable short-term 
impacts, whereas training programmes produced better outcomes in the 
medium-term. Public sector job creation programmes, on the other hand, had 
negative outcomes in both the short and medium runs. Card et al. (2010) also 
concluded that ALMPs do not have differential effects on males and females.  
 
The main policy implication that follows from Kluve (2006) and Card et al. (2010) 
is that programme type is what matters most for ALMP effectiveness. Training 
generally leads to a modest improvement in employment chances, while JSA and 
private sector employment incentives tend to show more favourable outcomes. 
However, public job creation schemes have generally been found to be less 
effective. Other contextual factors tend to be less important.  
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
International research on the impact of active labour market programmes is far 
from conclusive and faces a number of difficult methodological challenges, 
although it does suggest a number of tentative conclusions that can serve to 
guide policy. Rigorous Irish research is limited to a small number of studies and 
much of it relates to earlier historical periods characterised by different macro-
economic conditions to those prevailing today. Nevertheless, both sets of 
research indicate that the type of active labour market programme is important - 
some programmes work better than others – and help to identify the types of 
 
38   Card  et al. (2010) also took account of the heterogeneity of programme participants (e.g. gender, age, 
disadvantaged, etc.) in their meta-analysis.  22 
 
programmes that are more likely to enhance the employment prospects of 
unemployed participants. The principal conclusions of the research are as follows:   
•  Job Search Assistance, including counselling, job-placement, monitoring and 
the development of action plans, as well as training in job search techniques, 
tend to be effective, fast, and relatively inexpensive. Effective job search and 
monitoring should be the corner-stone of all services to unemployed people 
and serve as the gateway to employment and training opportunities, 
irrespective of prevailing labour market conditions. Activation is essential to 
maintain connection with the labour market, even during a recession.  Such 
activation  tends to be more effective when combined with regular 
monitoring of job search assistance and sanctions for non-compliance.  
•  Training tends to increase employment prospects, but it is important that 
training be strongly linked to skill demands in the labour market. Even in a 
slack labour market, training remains important to enable job seekers to 
compete for the limited opportunities that do exist and to maintain and 
development human capital to enable them to participate in any upturn in 
the economy and labour market. To ensure that training reflects labour 
demand, it is crucial that the skill requirements of employers are effectively 
communicated to training providers  on an ongoing basis, for example, 
through the development of sectoral skills councils. Such councils, which 
should include employers, training providers and government, could inform 
both the overall composition and content of skills training.    
•  Market links are also vital in supply side measures. This is why incentives to 
increase demand among private sector employers, or at least to real jobs in 
the public sector, can increase employment probabilities of participants.  In 
effect, such incentivised work experience is equivalent to training: both types 
of active labour market programme increase participants’ human capital.  
Lack of market linkages is also why public sector job creation in the social 
economy  does not enhance the employment prospects of participants, in 
Ireland as elsewhere, notwithstanding the useful social output of many such 
schemes. 
•  While the evidence on the impact of youth measures is mixed, there are 
encouraging results in respect of wage subsidies. In general ALMPS for young 
people tend to be more effective when implemented in a context of 
compulsory engagement with the PES.     
 
A number of important institutional  reforms have been initiated in the very 
recent period in Ireland and are currently being implemented. These include: i) 
the integration of  activation and income support functions within the 
Department of Social Protection; ii) the development of a case management 
system with stronger emphasis on activation; iii) the introduction of sanctions for  
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non-compliance with job-search and engagement with employment and training 
opportunities; iv) the development of a profiling system to allow targeting of 
scarce resources on those who need and can benefit from activation; and v) the 
abolition of FÁS, its replacement with the new further education and training 
authority, SOLAS, and the  assumption of responsibility for all labour market 
training and education by the  Department of Education and Skills. These are 
important reforms and represent a welcome shift to a more active labour market 
policy response to unemployment. The integration of income support with 
activation is welcome and is in line with best practice in many other European 
countries. However, it is as yet unclear how the provision of training is to be 
organised between DSP, SOLAS and the education and training providers.  The 
core principle governing that relationship between activation and training 
provision should be that the transition needs to be seamless, based on the needs 
of both unemployed individuals and current and future employers.  
 
An active labour market policy regime is based on effective programmes. Ireland 
invests substantial resources in ALMPs. In the context of mass unemployment 
and the fiscal crisis of the State, it is essential that this investment achieves the 
best value for money: we need to identify and allocate spending to those ALMPs 
that do most to enhance the employment prospects of those who participate in 
them.   
 
While this review of the evidence provides some clarity on the kinds of ALMPs 
that work, the scale of the Irish crisis is daunting.  There is a very substantial 
structural component to the Irish unemployment problem arising from the 
collapse of the construction sector. A very large number of unemployed 
individuals possess skills that are no longer in demand and are unlikely to be so 
for the foreseeable future.  This leaves policy makers with a two-fold challenge.  
Firstly, it is necessary to identify the areas for which former construction workers 
can be retrained. There has been little debate on this point. Research is needed 
that identifies expanding areas of the economy, particularly those to which the 
skills of former construction workers can be readily transferred.  Secondly, given 
the budget constraint, which rules out the provision of training for all, careful and 
informed consideration needs to be given as to how to allocate limited public 
resources in a manner that balances effectiveness and equity.   
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APPENDIX  
Table A1 is available to download at http://www.esri.ie/pubs/EC001App.pdf 
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